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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Gardner v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company, 372 S.E.2d 786
(W. Va. 1988).
Actions brought in state court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. sections 51 through 60, are not subject to
the common law principal of forum non-conveniens or similar state
statutes on removal.
The petitioners were 103 employees of Norfolk & Western Railway Company, a Virginia corporation. All of the plaintiffs allegedly
sustained traumatic injuries or hearing injuries while working for
the defendant in and out of West Virginia. Although the situs of
the various injuries is not known, none of the plaintiffs contended
that they had been exposed to any of the injuries in Brooke County,
West Virginia, where the action was filed. Additionally, none of the
witnesses or experts resided in Brooke County, West Virginia. Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum nonconveniens. The Brooke County Circuit Court held that the motion
1127
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989

1

1128

WEST
West Virginia
Law VIRGINIA
Review, Vol. LAW
91, Iss. REVIEW
4 [1989], Art. 11

[Vol. 91

to dismiss would not be gfanted to those class of plaintiffs who
resided in West Virginia, but granted the motion with respect to
those in which the plaintiffs were not residents of West Virginia.
The trial court also denied the defendant's motion under West Virginia Code chapter 56, article 9, section 1 (1939) to transfer to the
circuit court of the counties in which the West Virginia plaintiffs
were residents. The trial court on motion of the parties certified to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals the following question:
Are the common law principals of forum non-conveniens or similar
state statutes on removal applicable to actions under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act?
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals answered that these
statutes are not applicable. The court held that federal law does not
require the court to recognize or reject the common law principle
of forum non-conveniens. The court further noted that there are no
applicable statutes, that West Virginia's strong open court policy
and the strong policy favoring the plaintiff's choice of forum in a
case brought in state courts under the act mandated that neither the
common law principals of forum non-conveniens nor similar state
statutes on removal apply.
Gregory Vincent Smith

II.

CommERciAL LAw

Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 882 (W.
Va. 1988).
When the plaintiffs executed a Promissory Note and Security
Agreement in favor of defendant Finance One, the preprinted contract contained, on the reverse side, clause number fourteen, which
provided as follows:
Waiver of Homestead & Exemption Rights
To the extent permitted by law, I hereby waive and transfer to
lender any homestead or other exemption rights granted to me under
applicable law.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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The Orlandos defaulted on the loan and were the subject of nonjudicial collection activities. Finance One made no attempt to judicially enforce the waiver clause.
The Orlandos, in this class action, alleged that the waiver clause
was unconscionable and that its inclusion in the loan contract was
an unfair and deceptive practice employed by the defendant.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Brotherton, agreed that the waiver clause created a likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding and thus constituted an unfair commercial
practice. However, since the defendant made no attempt to enforce
the clause against the Orlandos or any other members of the class
who executed similar agreements, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals agreed that clause created the apparent protection of the
legal rights of the parties "to the extent permitted by law." Again,
because the defendant made no attempt to enforce the clause, the
Orlandos suffered no "ascertainable" loss of money and property
as a result of its inclusion in the loan contract.
Thus, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a statutory penalty against the defendant for violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act.
Matthew Victor
Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988).
In 1975, the appellee built a three-bedroom house near Martinsburg, West Virginia and sold it. The purchasers resold the house
some three and one-half years later to the appellants, and the appellee acted as the real estate agent. Soon after, heavy rains caused
flooding throughout much of the house, resulting in substantial
damage. Various efforts on the part of the appellants to repair the
damage were to no avail because of "how and where the house was
constructed."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice
McGraw, held that a builder has under a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the construction of a building,
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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and a subsequent homeowner can maintain an action against a builder
for negligence resulting in latent defects which the subsequent purchaser was unable to discover prior to purchase.
Moreover, implied warranties of habitability and fitness for use
as a family home may be extended to second and subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time after construction, but such
warranties are limited to latent defects which are not discoverable
by the subsequent purchasers through reasonable inspection and
which become manifest only after purchase.
In so holding West Virginia aligned itself with a growing number
of jurisdictions which have extended implied warranties to subsequent home purchasers.
Justice Neely dissented.
Matthew Victor
PeerlessPacking Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161
(W. Va. 1988).
In this case of first impression, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals was presented, on appeal, with a complicated set of facts.
Mr. Kizer managed the A & P store in Beckley, West Virginia.
When A & P substantially withdrew its operations from the state
in 1982, Mr. Kizer decided to take over the store. To accomplish
that goal, he entered into an agreement with a wholesaler of grocery
products for the southeastern states (appellee). Under the agreement,
appellee subleased the store to Mr. Kizer, sold him the store equipment for $200,000, and provided him with approximately $187,000
in additional inventory. In exchange, Mr. Kizer gave appellee a
promissory note for approximately $387,000 plus interest, secured
by a security interest in the present and after-acquired inventory.
Appellee perfected its lien against the store's collateral.
Appellants, twelve companies supplying wholesale products to
grocery stores, delivered the goods to Mr. Kizer's store on open
account credit extended to the store. None of appellants obtained
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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purchase money security interests in the inventory supplied by them.
When Mr. Kizer's business failed, he transferred all of his rights
in the store to appellee in return for his release from any liability
on the $387,000 note, the rent on the store and on an additional
$54,000 unsecured, open account owed appellee.
Appellee, assuming ownership of the store with Mr. Kizer as a
manager, advised the appellants that it assumed no liability to third
parties and, having realized on its security interest in the store's
assets, would not pay any invoices for deliveries before March 31,
1988, the date appellee took ownership.
Appellants sued Mr. Kizer for the unpaid accounts and sued
appellee under a theory of unjust enrichment.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Neely,
held that the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
exempted transfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other
security interest because an unsecured creditor of the transferror is
not prejudiced by a transfer of assets that satisfies the security interest of a transferee who already has priority over the unsecured
creditor. Since the payment of the $54,000 "open account" debt
was secured by the security interest in the inventory, the entire transfer was "in settlement of a security interest" and was excepted from
the bulk transfer requirement of ten days prior notice to appellant
unsecured creditors.
The court also held that a security interest generally continued
in "identifiable proceeds" from the sale or exchange of the collateral. Since, unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default
the right to the possession of the collateral, appellee had a security
interest in the proceeds as well.
A secured party may retain collateral in satisfaction of the secured debt, and the only parties who may object are a debtor who
has paid sixty percent of the purchase price of a consumer good or
other secured parties who notify the primary secured party of their
interests. Because appellants were general unsecured creditors, they
had no right to object to appellee's retention of the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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In rejecting the appellants' unjust enrichment claim, the court
held that despite its harsh appearance, the unsatisfied creditors (the
appellants herein) could have protected themselves either by demanding cash payments for their goods or by taking a purchase
money security interest in the goods they delivered.
Matthew Victor
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

State Ex Rel. Wilmoth v. Gustke, 373 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1988).
Every person has a first amendment right to question or challenge
the authority of a police officer.
A city police officer in the process of issuing a traffic citation
was approached by the petitioner, the owner of a shopping center
parking lot where the officer had stopped an offending driver.
Petitioner asked the officer to issue his ticket in another location,
as he felt the officer was driving away his business. After warning
petitioner to cease obstructing him in the process of issuing the traffic citation, and in the face of petitioner's persistence that the officer
get off his property, petitioner was arrested for obstructing an officer.
Petitioner was convicted in magistrate court, and the Circuit Court
of Wood County denied his motion for dismissal. The petitioner
contended that enforcement of West Virginia Code chapter 61, article 5, section 7 (1931) under the facts of his case was an unconstitutional infringement of his right to free speech as guaranteed by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court agreed, holding that every person has a clear first
amendment right to question or challenge the authority of a police
officer, but that this right does not encompass fighting words, opprobrious language, or forcible or other illegal hinderance.
Gregory Vincent Smith
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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City of Fairmont v. Schumaker, 375 S.E.2d 785 (W. Va. 1988).
A defendant charged by a municipal warrant for an offense that
carries a mandatory jail sentence has a right to a jury trial in municipal court.
The defendant was charged in a city warrant with driving under
the influence of alcohol. The defendant requested a jury trial in
municipal court, and the motion was removed to the Circuit Court
of Marion County for the requested jury trial.
By certified question, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was asked whether the defendant had the right to a jury trial
in a municipal court for an offense carrying a mandatory jail sentence where a municipality does not provide jury trials, but rather
removes such cases to the circuit court. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals responded yes. The right to a jury trial is accorded
to both felons and misdemanants when any potential period of incarceration is involved.
Gregory Vincent Smith
IV.

CORPORATIONS

Vankirk v. Young, 375 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1988).
Where the shareholders in a close corporation each hold fifty
percent of the corporation's outstanding stock, one shareholder cannot attempt to invoke the buy-out provision which permits only
majority shareholders in a corporation to force a buy-out of the
majority shareholders' stock.
As unsuccessful corporation's shareholders, Young and Vankirk,
were hopelessly deadlocked in its management. Young, as a fifty
percent shareholder, invoked the buy-out provisions to force a buyout of Vankirk's stock in the enterprise.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Brotherton, found neither of the stockholders to be properly characterized
as a majority shareholder. While the court found it unfortunate that
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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the applicable legislation did not foresee a situation of an equal
division of shares in a closely held corporation, the court abstained
from rewriting the statutory language so as to provide relief for
equal shareholders or from interpreting statutory language in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.
The proposed forced buy-out was thus denied.
Matthew Victor
V.

CRIaMNAL LAW/PROCDURE

State v. Johnson, 371 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1988).
The prosecution of a single conspiracy as more than one conspiracy merely because two separate substantive crimes have been
committed is a violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Pendleton
County of breaking and entering, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and conspiracy to commit breaking and entering.
All of the charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant
was implicated by an indicted co-conspirator as the driver of a car
she used in the process of breaking into her parents' store.
Although a number of issues were presented to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, the most important was the question
of whether an agreement by a defendant to a conspiracy to commit
one or more substantive crimes subjects him to being charged with
multiple conspiracy crimes.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that if there
is more than one agreement involved, multiple conspiracy convictions can be lawfully obtained. The court noted that the federal
appeals courts have evolved a number of factors under a totality of
circumstances rule to find if one or two separate conspiracies exist
for double jeopardy purposes. Normally, the considerations are 1)
time, 2) persons acting as co-conspirators, 3) the statutory offenses
charged, 4) the overt act charged, 5) and the places where the events
alleged as part of the conspiracy took place. The key is to find if
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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there is one agreement to commit two crimes or more than one
agreement each with a separate object; therefore, the defendant's
conviction of two conspiracies constituted a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Gregory Vincent Smith
State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731 (1988).
An expert may testify as to the alleged victim behavior consistent
with rape trauma syndrome; however, the expert cannot give an
opinion, expressly or implicitly, as to whether the alleged victim was
raped.
In a second degree rape case, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals considered a distinction between an expert's testimony
that an alleged victim had exhibited post-rape behavior consistent
with rape trauma syndrome and the expert's opinion which bolstered
the alleged victim's credibility indicating that she was indeed raped.
The wintess, qualified as an expert, testified that the alleged rape
victim displayed behavior consistent with someone who had been
sexually assaulted. She concluded that the victim was "still traumatized by this experience."
The court reviewed several important decisions from other jurisdictions, concluding that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome should not be admissible to show whether or not the victim
was, in fact, raped. Permitting an expert to conclude that because
an alleged victim suffers from rape trauma syndrome, such person
was indeed raped creates a danger of the expert vouching too much
for victim's credibility and supplying verisimilitude for her on the
initial issue of whether the defendant raped her. The jury might
place too much emphasis on the testimony of the witness because
of his or her status as an expert.
The witness's statement that the alleged victim was "still trau,
matized by this experience" contained an implicit conclusion that
she had been raped and, as such, constituted reversible error.
Matthew Victor
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State v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988).
West Virginia follows twenty-one jurisdictions in admitting bitemark evidence for positive identification purposes.
Since the reliability of bite-mark evidence as a means of positive
identification is established in forensic dentistry, a court can take
judicial notice of such reliability without conducting an "in camera
hearing" on the same.
Several hours after a restaurant robbery, the establishment's assistant manager found a wet paper towel in the restaurant's trash
can. The paper towel appeared to have been chewed. Meanwhile,
through further investigation, the defendant was located and arrested
for the robbery. At the trial level, the court authorized casts of the
defendant's teeth to be made for comparison with the teeth marks
on the paper towel.
The state's forensic expert concluded at trial that the bite-mark
pattern in the towel was that of defendant's teeth to the exclusion
of "all other individuals."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals accepted the invitation of other states and held that where a qualified expert was
involved, bite-mark evidence was admissible for positive identification purposes. In so doing, the court followed a more liberal test
which holds that a scientific expert's testimony is admissible if shown
to involve relevant and sufficiently established scientific tests which
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, even if such tests
and the underlying scientific principles are not yet generally accepted
in the particular scientific field.
Since reliability of bite-mark evidence as a means of positive
identification is established in forensic dentistry, trial courts can approve of that acceptance by taking judicial notice thereof without
conducting an "in camera hearing" on the same.

Matthew Victor

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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State v. Haught, 371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Chief Justice
McHugh, declared three important holdings in the area of criminal
procedure:
1) Before a trial court conditions its recommendations for parole upon the de-

fendant's payment of a statutory fine, costs and attorney's fees, the trial court
must consider the financial resources of the defendant, his ability to pay and the
nature of the burden that the payment of such costs will impose upon the defendant.
2) During a preliminary hearing held for the purpose of determining probable
cause for an arrest or search, the trial court is not required to disclose the identity
of a confidential credible informant, provided that it would impose an unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to require that the informant's identity be disclosed at the hearing.
3) Even though the prosecuting attorney participated in the investigation of the
defendant and actually was present at his arrest, if the prosecutor's interest does
not go beyond his/her dedication to the case, the defendant has no right to have
a special prosecutor appointed.

Matthew Victor
State v. Mullens, 371 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 1988).
A confession of an accomplice which inculpates the accused is
presumptively unreliable.
Where the accomplice is unavailable for cross-examination, the
admission of the confession, absent sufficient independent indicia
of reliability to rebut the presumption of unreliability, violates the
sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The police investigation of two shootings in Pineville, W. Va.,
led to the arrest of Russell Reed and to the charge that the defendant
Mullens had hired Reed to kill her husband.
At the defendant's trial, the state called Reed to the stand. Reed,
however, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify, despite repeated warnings from the
bench. The state proceeded, then, to question Reed from a statement
he had given to the police in which he admitted his guilt and implicated the defendant. The defendant argued that Reed's invocation
of the fifth amendment effectively denied her of her sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Brotherton, held that when a person accuses another of a crime under
circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating
another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination.
The court observed, however, that the confrontation errors, although constitutional violations, did not automatically warrant reversal. In remanding the case to determine the circumstances of
Reed's confession, the court listed specific factors to be taken into
account:
1) whether Reed's statement was spontaneous or a result of custodial police
questioning;
2) whether the statement was thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to the defendant's penal interest; and
3) whether the statement was corrobated by other evidence presented at trial,
including physical evidence.

Matthew Victor
State ex rel. Moore v. Conrad, 371 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1988).
Defendant Moore, arrested on November 19, 1985 upon a fugitive-from-justice warrant issued by a Clay County, W. Va. magistrate, was charged with a sexual battery committed in Pasco County,
Fla.
On February 21, 1986, ninety-four days after the original arrest,
the defendant was re-arrested pursuant to the governor's warrant
of extradition. On that day the Circuit Court of Clay County directed the defendant to make application for a writ of habeas corpus. At the subsequent hearing on March 21, 1986, the circuit court
concluded that defendant was entitled to release from custody because, based on the evidence presented, he was not within the demanding state at the time of the alleged offense.
On July 13, 1987, West Virginia's Governor issued an extradition
warrant for the arrest of Moore upon the request of the Governor
of Florida. Moore contended that the resolution of his March 21,
1986 hearing constituted res judicata as to any later governor's warhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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rants for extradition arising from the same acts and allegations.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Brotherton, disagreed. The court held that where a criminal prosecution
is halted due to lack of evidence showing presence in the demanding
state, res judicata should not operate to bar a subsequent extradition
proceeding if at some later date the demanding state can produce
such evidence.
The court did not elaborate on any new evidence concerning the
defendant's presence in Florida at the time of the alleged offense.
Matthew Victor

VI.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

District 1199 WV/KY/OH Nat'l Union of Hospitaland Health Care
Employees, AFL-CIO v. West Virginia Dep't of Health, 377 S.E.2d
498 (W. Va. 1988).
The employer has a duty to hold employment grievance hearings
at the worksite unless otherwise agreed by parties.
The aggrieved employee has the right to use, free of charge, the
employer's copy machine for the purpose of copying the grievance
documents and the transcript of the employment grievance hearing.
In this first-impression mandamus action, petitioners McCall and
Blankenship requested that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals direct the employer/respondent to hold grievance hearings at
the petitioners' worksite rather than in Charleston, where the Department of Health is located.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, per Justice Brotherton, held that the petitioners had a clear right and the respondent
a legal duty to hold the hearing at the worksite unless it was determined and agreed by the parties that the hearing should be held
elsewhere.
The court also stated that the grievant should have access to the
employer's equipment for purposes of preparing grievance docuDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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ments, subject to the reasonable rules of the employer governing
the use of such equipment. A responsible representative of the employer should provide a requesting party with a copy of the certified
transcript of a grievance hearing.
In this particular case the court found no reason why the respondent could not copy the certified transcript on the employer's
equipment, free of charge.
Matthew Victor
VII. EVMENCE
Moore v. Goode, 375 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1988).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in this determination-of-the-beneficiaries case, reaffirmed its previous holding that
a judgment from a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is a
nullity, and as such, cannot be admitted into evidence to prove the
facts contained therein.
The ancient document rule is still a viable hearsay exception.
Therefore, statements in a document in existence twenty years or
more, the authenticity of which is established, are admissible. The
court, however, qualified that statement by holding that one document itself or its contents cannot be suspicious with regard to genuineness and reliability.
The court also affirmed the viability of the vital statistics exception to the hearsay rule by noting that such exception pertained
to those facts or events contained in a report which the public official had a duty to record. Thus a certified copy of a certificate
issued by the state registrar of vital statistics or any part thereof
shall be considered for all purposes the same as the original and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
In discussing the operation and applicability of the Dead Man's
Act, the court pointed to a concurrence of three general conditions
which must be met in order to bar the admissibility of a witness's
testimony:
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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1) the testimony must relate to a personal transaction with a deceased or insane
person;
2) the witness must be a party to the suit or interested in its outcome; and
3) the testimony must be against the deceased's personal representative, heir at
law, or beneficiaries, or the assignee or committee of an insane person.

The court also observed that where an attorney who no longer represents the interested party retains a fee interest in the outcome of
the litigation, his testimony on behalf of his former client which
involves a personal transaction with the deceased barred by the Dead
Man's Act.
In addressing the family history and pedigree exception to the
hearsay rule, the court observed that at common law, such an exception could be achieved in a twofold manner: by general reputation evidence or by specific extrajudicial statements from family
members who were unavailable at trial, provided that there was no
apparent motive for the declarant to misrepresent the facts. It is not
necessary that the declarant be related to the family so as to be in
possession of accurate information concerning the matter declared.
Matthew Victor
VIII.

FAMnMY LAW

Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988).
A professional degree earned during a marriage is not "marital
property" subject to equitable distribution.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals herein introduced
the concept of reimbursement alimony into West Virginia law.
The Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered a final order dissolving the parties' marriage. Appellant Rebecca Hoak argued that
her husband's medical degree was a right or interest acquired during
their four-year marriage, and that she should share in the increased
earning capacity he will achieve as a result of her financial and other
contributions. She therefore alleged that the circuit court erred in
its failure to hold that her husband's license to practice medicine
was marital property subject to equitable distribution.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's holding that a professional degree earned during a marriage
is not property that is subject to equitable distribution, a view shared
by the majority of jurisdictions.
The court also introduced into the state's body of law the concept
of reimbursement alimony, but declined to draw any bright line rules
as to the computing of such an award. Instead, the court stated
that if the circuit court finds that a party made financial contributions to a spouse's education with the expectation of the education
bringing him or her a higher standard of living, then the court should
try to make a fair and reasonable award based upon whatever method
it deemed appropriate.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Interest of Betty J. W., 371 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 1988).
A parental improvement period must be allowed before parental
rights can be terminated unless there are compelling circumstances
to justify its denial.
The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) took
emergency custody of the five minor children of Mary W. and her
husband J. B. W. The DHS petition to terminate the parties parental
rights alleged that the husband sexually abused and assaulted his
seventeen-year-old daughter and that he was a habitual physical
abuser of his children. The petition also alleged the wife failed to
protect the children from her husband's abuse.
At the final hearing, both parties requested parental improvement
periods. The court denied the requested improvement periods and
terminated both parties parental rights.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the state's interest in the welfare of children favors the preservation, not the severance, of family bonds, but that the state also
has a clear interest in protecting the children from abuse and neglect
by parents. This dual state interest is reflected in the statute which
permits a party to move for an improvement period. The courts
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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must allow the requested improvement period unless "compelling
circumstances" justify its denial.
The court noted that the failure to grant the improvement period
requested by Mary W. was due in large part to the circuit court's
finding that she knowingly allowed her husband to commit the abuse
but the record clearly did not support this finding. Additionally, the
court found that no consideration had been given to granting an
improvement period without the children being returned to the home.
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that the court below erroneously appeared to believe it had to return the children to the home
during any granted improvement period.
Thus, the court held that unless some "compelling circumstances" justify its denial, the moving parent must be granted an
improvement period although such period may be granted without
the children being in the home.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Lowe v. Lowe, 370 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988).
Circuit courts have the authority to grant joint custody of minor
children in a divorce order after finding that both parties so agree,
that the parties can cooperate sufficiently so as to make the joint
custody feasible, and that it would promote the welfare of the children.
The Family Law Master incorporated a joint custody agreement
into his recommendations to the Circuit Court of Berkley County.
The circuit court certified the following question to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals: Does a circuit court have the statutory
authority to provide for the joint custody of a minor child in a
divorce action?
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that the
principal has long been established that the welfare of a minor child
is the polar star by which the courts should be guided, and that the
courts presume it is in the best interest of the child to be placed
with the primary care-taker if fit. But, where the parties to a divorce
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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ask for joint custody and submit to the court a joint parenting
agreement specifying each party's powers, rights, responsibilities,
and ways of resolving disputes, joint custody must be investigated.
The court specified that the
circuit court shall inquire into the parties ability to agree and
cooperate and make findings as to the agreement's promotion of
the welfare of the children in order to grant the requested joint
custody.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d 190 (W. Va. 1988).
When seeking modification of a foreign child support decree, the
better result is obtained by filing under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
Petitioner-mother, a nine-year resident of West Virginia, filed
for modification of a California child support order in the Circuit
Court of Cabell County. Respondent-father, a California resident,
was served with process during a visit to West Virginia (he remains
a California resident). The respondent's answer alleged that the West
Virginia court lacked jurisdiction and that the forum was inconvenient. The circuit court dismissed the petition on the basis of lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner-mother appealed, raising the issue of
whether a West Virginia court has jurisdiction to modify a foreign
child support decree where respondent-father is a resident of another
state.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that the
respondent had established sufficient contact with West Virginia to
make jurisdiction equitable but noted that the question of subject
matter jurisdiction remained. The court held that West Virginia adheres to the traditional lex loci delicti theory of conflicts of law,
and thus the law of California (the state of the original decree) would
apply. In reviewing California law, the court found that the California courts permit the modification of a foreign support decree
in its courts. Consequently, a strict application of California law
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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would allow petitioner to Consequently, a strict application of California law would allow petitioner to maintain her action for modification in West Virginia. But the court found that in this case the
forum was not convenient for maintaining the action and that a
more equitable and efficient approach would be to proceed under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). The
court dismissed the petitioner's appeal without prejudice, noting that
it should be refiled under the provisions of URESA.
Gregory Vincent Smith
IX.

INSURANCE

Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988).
In a suit for recovery under provisions of a motor vehicle liability
policy, aspects of the insurance contract ordinarily will be construed
according to the laws of the state where the policy was issued and
the risk insured.
The defendant was the named insured under a motor vehicle
policy issued to her in Pennsylvania, where she was a resident. While
operating her vehicle in Wheeling, West Virginia, she was involved
in a two car accident, and a non-contact incident with a "John Doe"
unknown motorist was the stated cause of the accident.
The parties certified to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals the question of whether the enforceability of the physical contact clause in the insurance contract should be determined under
West Virginia or Pennsylvania law.
Although the policy expressly required physical contact
uninsured motor vehicle, Pennsylvania has held that such
ments are contrary to public policy. However, the West
Code requires physical contact in order to recover under
insured motorist coverage.

with an
requireVirginia
the un-

The court held that, in a suit to recover under a motor vehicle
liability policy, provisions in the contract will ordinarily be construed
according to the law of the state where the policy was issued.
Gregory Vincent Smith
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TransamericaOccidentalLife v. Burk, 368 S.E.2d 301 (W. Va. 1988).
Where the designation of beneficiaries of a life insurance policy
or other death benefits is ambiguous, declarations of the insured
are admissible as evidence of his intent.
Decedent designated that his death benefits should be paid fifty
percent to his wife and fifty percent to his "children." Decedent
had three children from his first marriage and three step-children
from his second marriage. Upon decedent's death, one of his natural
children objected to the proposed six-way distribution.
On appeal of this interpleader action from a final order of the
Circuit Court of Randolph County, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals found that the trial court's holding that as a matter of
law, the term "children" does not include step-children was reversible error.
The high court held that proffered extrinsic evidence as to the
decedent's intent as to the use of the term "children" should be
admitted to resolve any ambiguity and reversed and remanded the
action for a new trial.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Horace Mann Insurance Company v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581 (W.
Va. 1988).
There is no duty to defend or pay for, damages caused by the
sexual misconduct of an insured, where the liability insurance policy
contains an "intentional injury" exclusion.
A school teacher had pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual abuse
for sexual actions involving one of his students. The student's parents filed a civil action against the teacher and the board of education. The insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action
against the teacher, the board, the student, and his parents to determine both its obligation to defend the teacher and its duty to
afford coverage for any judgment. The trial court certified to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals the following question:
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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Does an insurance company which provides general liability insurance that contains an "intentional injury" exclusion have a duty to
defend and to pay any judgment on behalf of a public school teacher
who had sexual contacts with one of his minor students?
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that insurer
had no duty to defend or pay. In its analysis, the court pointed out
some general principles: the duty of an insurer to defend is generally
broader than its obligation to provide coverage, and if some, but
not all, of the claims against the insured fall within the coverage
of a liability policy, the insurer must defend all claims. The court
noted that the insured's right to a defense will not be lost unless
inescapably necessary, but that a liability insurer need not defend
the insured if the alleged conduct is entirely foreign to the risk contracted.
The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions that have ruled
on these issues has held that an objective test is to be used in analyzing an intentional injury exclusion in a liability insurance policy.
These jurisdictions have held that the insured must both act and
also intend to cause some kind of injury. Importantly, however, the
intent to cause injury will be inferred as a matter of law in a sexual
misconduct liability insurance case. Thus, West Virginia now follows
the majority rule in its holding that, where a liability insurance policy
contains an "intentional injury" exclusion, there is neither a duty
to defend nor a duty to pay in an action for damages allegedly
caused by the insured's sexual misconduct.
Gregory Vincent Smith
X.

LEGAL ETmcs

Committee On Legal Ethics v. Triplett, No. 18396 (October 26, 1988).
The United States Department of Labor's system of awarding
attorneys' fees in black lung cases is in violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
An attorney is not guilty of professional misconduct for failure
to follow an unconstitutional law.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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The Committee on Legal Ethics recommended a six month suspension of the respondent's license to practice law for his failure
to obtain Department of Labor approval of a contingent fee arrangement allowing himself twenty-five percent of accrued benefits
collected on behalf of his clients in black lung actions.
The question presented to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals was whether the federal limits on attorneys' fees in black
lung cases was violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States by its constructive
denial of claimant's access to legal counsel.
In an extremely clear analysis, the court held the regulation of
attorney fees in black lung cases by the Department of Labor worked
to effectively deny black lung claimant's necessary access to legal
counsel and was thus clearly and unambiguously in violation of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court stated that an unconstitutional laws is void and that
respondent could not be charged with an offense created by a void
law, thus holding that the attorney was therefore not guilty of any
ethical violations.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Committee On Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va.
1988).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may review attorney disciplinary charges for which the committee on legal ethics
does not recommend discipline.
A lawyer's personal attacks upon judges or other court officials
is not protected speech if it is knowingly false or made with reckless
disregard for the truth.
Statements made by lawyers that are outside of any community
concern and designed to ridicule the legal system do not enjoy first
amendment protection.
The respondent lawyer made statements to the press that were
critical of two circuit court judges. He also was photographed dressed
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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in military fatigues and armed with facsimile bow, arrow, knife,
rifle and ammunition, saying, "Just like Rambo I'll defend against
the judges alone if necessary." Ethics complaints were filed against
the attorney, and hearings were held on the various charges before
a sub-committee of the hearing panel of the State Committee on
Legal Ethics. The sub-committee and the full committee recommended a six month suspension of the respondent's license to practice law for the various ethics violations.
The respondent had been charged with conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice as a result of his comments. After a lengthy
analysis, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
free speech clause of the first amendment protects a lawyer for his
criticism of the legal system and its judges, but the protection is
not absolute. Statements that are knowingly false or made with a
reckless disregard for the truth are not protected, nor are statements
that are "outside of the community concern" and meant only to
ridicule the legal system. The court remanded the charges relating
to various statements by the attorney for further development in
light of its articulated standard noting its authority to regulate and
supervise the practice of law.
Additionally, the respondent had been charged with filing a frivolous and harassing complaint, which charge was dismissed by the
hearing panel.
The court addressed the breadth of its authority to review disciplinary charges that had been dismissed by the hearing panel and
restated its inherent power to supervise the practice of law in West
Virginia. The court noted that its delegating power to the Committee
on Legal Ethics did not divest it of the inherent power to have the
final word on the subject of the practice of law in this state. The
court thus also remanded this second count for reconsideration.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Committee On Legal Ethics v. Lewis, 371 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1988).
Attorney disciplinary proceedings may be instituted by a review
of proceedings in other jurisdictions.
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The Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar
instituted proceedings to annul the license to practice law of an
attorney formerly admitted to practice in this state.
The only evidence presented by the committee consisted entirely
of a certified copy of an Oklahoma court's judgment and sentencing
order wherein an Oklahoma lawyer resigned from the practice of
law after being charged with two counts of embezzlement and one
count of possession of a controlled substance.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that where
there was no response by the attorney or any rebuttal of the Committee's charges, the Committee satisfied its burden of proof.
Gregory Vincent Smith
XI.

Loc.J GOVERNAMNT/PUBLIC OFIMCIALS

Carr v. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1988).
The position of assistant prosecuting attorney is an appointed
public office and persons holding this office are prohibited from
serving as a member of any county board of education.
The respondent was a part-time assistant county prosecutor. He
filed as a candidate for election to the McDowell County Board of
Education, indicating that he would not resign his position as assistant prosecuting attorney if elected. The Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to issue a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Board
of Ballot Commissioners to omit respondent's name from the ballot.
The court responded by granting the writ.
The court concluded that the office of assistant prosecuting attorney was a "public office" within the meaning of West Virginia
Code chapter 18, article 5, section 1A (1976), rendering the respondent ineligible to serve as a member of the county board of
education.
Gregory Vincent Smith
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Cross Lanes/Tyler Mountain Community Association, v. Hunt, 367
S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1988).
A condition to conduct an election contest is afforded only
through the constitution or statutory provisions. Where no manner
has been provided to contest a public question election, the courts
are without power to hear the issues.
The county commission ordered a special election in an action
seeking to adjoin the certification of the results of a municipal incorporation election pursuant to a petition to incorporate Cross
Lanes, an unincorporated area of Kanawha County. After the defeat
of the petition, numerous objections were raised as to the integrity
of the election. After taking evidence, the county commission declared that the alleged irregularities had no effect on the outcome,
and the petition was defeated.
The formal certification of the election results was delayed by
a demand for a recount. The recount changed only one vote, and
the county commission then declared the defeat of the petition. Before the commission could make its formal certification, the petitioners filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
seeking to set aside the results of the election.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct an election
contest or to nullify a public question election. The Supreme Court
of Appeals agreed. Noting that this is not an issue of first impression, the court held that jurisdiction to conduct an election contest is afforded only through the constitution or statutory provisions.
Where no manner has been provided by the Legislature to contest
a public question election, the courts are without power to hear such
contests. The court held that this is a matter for the Legislature and
that it, not the courts, must provide the remedies for such controversies.
Gregory Vincent Smith
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Feltz v. Crabtree, 370 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
A magistrate must resign his office upon becoming a candidate
for another office unless it is a "judicial office."
The plaintiff, a Marion County magistrate, filed as a candidate
for the office of Circuit Clerk of Marion County. Shortly thereafter,
he was advised by the Administrative Director of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals that he must resign his magistrate position in order to seek the office of circuit clerk.
In this case of first impression, the court, per Justice Brotherton,
stated that a circuit clerk is not a judicial officer because the clerk
does not exercise judicial power. Although the clerk is part of the
judicial branch of government, he is not the kind of judicial officer
contemplated by the legislative language. Only justices, judges and
magistrates are included in the term "judicial officers."
Because a circuit clerk is not a judicial officer, plaintiff was
required to resign from his magistrate position.

Matthew Victor
Rodgers v. Corporationof HarpersFerry, 371 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va.
1988)
Claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are personal injury
actions governed by state two-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiff was arrested by police officers from the Corporations
of Harpers Ferry and Bolivar, Jefferson County, West Virginia on
August 8, 1983, and charged with drunk driving, assault and battery,
and obstruction of an officer. On August 6, 1985, plaintiff filed a
42 U.S.C. section 1983 action charging defendant with the use of
excessive force, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, defamation and gross
negligence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in this case of
first impression, determined that all claims filed in West Virginia
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations.
The plaintiff's claim was allowed, and the case was remanded
for proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
Matthew Victor
Scott v. Marion County Commission, 377 S.E.2d 476 (W. Va. 1988).
A petition to initiate a fire service fee for county volunteer fire
departments required the signature of ten percent of the registered
voters only in the part of the county that would have to pay the
fee, not ten percent of the voters of the entire county.
On a certified question from the Marion County Circuit Court,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to interpret
the ambiguity found in West Virginia Code chapter 7, article 17,
section 12 (1984) concerning whether an ordinance imposing a fire
service fee can be initiated by a petition signed by ten percent of
the voters in the affected part of the county, or whether must it
must be signed ten percent of the registered voters of the entire
county.
The court held that the Legislature found it desirable for county
governments to provide fire protection and that the structure of the
Code was deliberately designed to make simple the initiation of a
fire service fee. The court held a petition to initiate a fire service
fee for the benefit of county volunteer fire departments requires only
the signature of ten percent of the voters in the affected area.
Gregory Vincent Smith
Habursky v. Recht, 375 S.E.2d 760 (W. Va. 1988).
Police civil service promotion rules that base seniority points upon
"years of in-grade service" are invalid.
Appellants, two City of Wheeling police officers, tested for promotion to the rank of sergeant with other competing officers. The
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Police Civil Service Commission (PCSC) initially calculated seniority
points in the promotion process based on years of service within
the police department. Thus, it was determined that appellant Jacobs
had the highest overall score and that appellant Habursky had the
second highest overall score. Shortly thereafter, the PCSC recalculated the appellant seniority points, substituting years of in-grade
service for the years of total service category. Using the new "ingrade" calculation, the PCSC issued a revised eligibility list for promotion to the one position of sergeant. Appellant Jacobs now had
the second highest score instead of the first, and appellant Habursky
had the fifth highest score instead of the second. The recalculation
of scores was in line with the long-standing policy of the PCSC to
calculate seniority based upon years of in-grade service as opposed
to total years of service.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that basing
seniority points for promotion upon "years of in-grade service" is
invalid because it is too restrictive and conflicts with West Virginia
Code chapter 8, article 14, section 17 (1969). Noting that the PCSC
and the circuit court have relied upon a long standing interpretation
that is wrong, the court reversed the circuit court's affirming of the
final order of the PCSC.

Gregory Vincent Smith

XII.

PROPERTY

Moundsville Housing Authority v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va.
1988).
A tenant in a federally subsidized low-income housing project
owned and operated by the defendant enjoyed a month-to-month
rental tenancy agreement. However, during the night of June 3,
1986, she was awakened from sleep and beaten by her live-in companion. Following her brief hospitalization and her assailant's arrest,
she was evicted by the defendant for an alleged violation of the
terms of the lease by allowing the disturbance to occur.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11

28

11551
DIGESTS
CASEVirginia
1?891
Smith and Victor: Case Digests: West
Supreme Court of Appeals Decisions,

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that an
isolated incident did not amount to a serious violation of a material
term of the lease. While the court, in its per curiam opinion, noted
that "it is easy for a public housing project to become a violent,
dangerous slum," one incident of boisterous behavior beyond the
control of the lessee is not sufficient to justify the termination of
a valuable contractual right.
Matthew Victor
Cogar v. Faerber, 371 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1988).
Simply obtaining a lease of mineral rights to an area does not
confer valid existing rights upon an operator within the meaning of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
The defendant has operated the Smoot Mine since 1983. The
residents of the area objected to the modification of the permit
allowing new openings to the underground mine because the openings were within 100 feet of a public road and 300 feet of occupied
dwellings. The defendant claimed that under the Legislative Rules
filed by West Virginia Department of Energy, a person passes valid
existing rights if he can demonstrate that the coal is immediately
aqjacent to an ongoing mining operation which existed on August
3, 1977 and is needed to make the operation economically viable as
t whole.
Interpreting the meaning of "valid existing rights" under the
West Virginia regulations and the definition of "operation," the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals observed that the primary
purpose of the mining statute is to expand the regulatory program
involving surface mining and to protect the public and the environment from the adverse effects of surface mining operations.
Justice McGraw, speaking for the unanimous court, held that
valid existing rights must involve more than a mere expectation of
conducting coal mining. Simply obtaining a lease of mineral rights
to an area does not confer valid existing rights upon an operation
within the meaning of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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Act. Therefore, for the defendant to have valid existing rights under
the Act, the operator must have completed, by August 3, 1977, its
portion of the application process for all the necessary state and
federal permits to conduct surface mining in an area contiguous to
the proposed operations.
Since the court construed any exceptions to the statutes narrowly,
the modification of permit was denied.

Matthew Victor
Imperial Colliery Company v. Fout, 373 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1988).
Retaliation may be asserted as a defense to a summary eviction
proceeding if the landlord's conduct is in retaliation for the tenant's
exercise of a right incidental to the tenancy.
In this case of first impression, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals considered two important issues: 1) whether a residential
tenant who is sued for possession of rental property may assert
retaliation by the landlord as a defense, and 2) whether the retaliation motive must relate to the tenant's exercise of a right incidental
to the tenancy.
A coal miner alleged an eviction in retaliation for his participation in a selective strike against his employer/landlord. The final
disposition of the case went against the plaintiff since his allegation
of the retaliatory eviction did not relate to the tenant's activities
incidental to tenancy, and the first amendment rights of speech and
association were unrelated to the tenant's property interests and, as
such, were not protected under a retaliatory eviction defense.
The court nevertheless held that retaliation may be asserted as
a defense to a summary eviction proceeding if the landlord's conduct
is in retaliation for the tenant's exercise of a right incidental to the
tenancy. Thus, a tenant should not be punished for claiming the
benefits afforded by health and safety statutes passed for his protection. His rights to organize, to protect collective rights, and to
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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press complaints against landlord via oral communications/petitions
were held to bear a relationship to some legitimate aspects of the
tenancy.
Matthew Victor
Lilly v. Duke, 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988).
This case overruled the holding of Syllabus Point 9 in Pearson
v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975) insofar as it precludes a
land owner or other party in interest to real property from bringing
suit to set aside the tax sale of property based on a constitutionally
defective notice.
In 1978, the plaintiffs executed a Deed of Trust to purchase
23.681 acres in Jackson County. No taxes were paid by the plaintiffs
in 1980. The county sheriff posted and published newspaper notice
of tax delinquency, and a second notice announced that the land
would be offered for sale at public auction in October of 1981. There
being no bids, the sheriff purchased the tract for the state. The tract
was unredeemed for the statutory eighteen month period and the
deputy commissioner forfeited the delinquent lands and sold the
tract to defendant Duke for $50 at auction.
The plaintiffs filed suit to set aside the tax deed in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County. The court entered summary judgment for
the defendant.
On appeal, the issue before the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals was whether a property owner or mortgagee can be deprived of his property interest without an adequate notice prior to
a sheriff's sale.
In analyzing a number of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions, the court found that there are certain due process requirements for notice in the tax sale of real property. Thus, where
parties having an interest in the property can reasonably be identified, due process requires that such party be provided notice by
mail or other means certain to ensure an adequate notice. In so
doing, the court overruled its prior holding of Syllabus Point 9 of
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Parsons insofar as it would preclude a land owner or other party
having an interest in real property from bringing suit to set aside
the tax sale or property based on a constitutionally defective notice.
Gregory Vincent Smith
XIII.

SCHOOL LAw

Weimer-Goodwin v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 369 S.E.2d 726,
47 Educ. L. Rep. 755 (W. Va. 1988).
Once a county board of education pays additional compensation
to certain teachers, it must pay the same amount of additional compensation to other teachers performing "like assignments and duties."
Prejudgment interest on back pay is recoverable against a county
board of education in a grievance claim based on a misinterpretation
of a statute regarding compensation.
An attorney's gratuitous representation of a client does not prevent an award of reasonable attorney's fees.
The appellant, an itinerant general music teacher and choral director, performed in the school years 1979-80 through 1985-86 various non-instructional duties outside the scheduled hours of the
regular school day for which she received no additional compensation.
By contrast, the string and band instrument teachers were paid
additional compensation for substantially the same extracurricular
activities in their respective fields.
The appellant claimed to have been qualified to receive the same
amount of salary supplement as the string and band instrument
teachers.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that teachers
performing "like assignments and duties" were entitled to additional
uniform compensation and ordered the board to pay the appellant
the salary supplement in addition to prejudgment interest.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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While the appellant was represented gratuitously by her husband
in the administrative and circuit court proceedings, such representation did not preclude a reasonable attorney's fees award. However,
the attorney must submit to the circuit court an itemized attorneyfee bill and demonstrate its reasonableness before the award is made.
Matthew Victor
State ex rel. Rose v. Raleigh County Bd. of Educ., 367 S.E.2d 223,
46 Educ. L. Rep. 852 (W. Va. 1988).
Marion County Bd. of Educ. v. Bonfantino, 366 S.E.2d 650 (W.
Va. 1988).
A county board of education must post statutory notice of vacancy, and the principal of a school in which such vacancy occurred
is without authority to assign another teacher to that vacancy.
In these two opinions, decided within one month of each other,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that when a vacancy occurs in a teaching position at a public school, the county
board of education must post a notice of such vacancy, and the
principal of the school in which the vacancy occurs is without authority to assign another teacher to the vacancy.
Thus the Rose court stated that the board was without authority
to assign Mrs. Black, a seventh grade geography teacher at Park
Junior High School, Raleigh County, to the ninth grade history
position without previously posting the notice of vacancy. Appellant
Rose, in possession of proper certification, a master's degree and
more seniority than Mrs. Black, applied for the position only to
learn that the position had already been assigned to Mrs. Black.
The Rose court further stated that a county board of education
must make promotions and decisions to fill vancacies on the basis
of individual qualifications.

Matthew Victor
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STATE GOVERNMENT

Heiskel v. Hechler, No. 18771 (November 3, 1988).
The secretary of state is vested with broad authority, after consultation with the state's election commission, to promulgate rules
and regulations, but he is not required to implement the election
commission's suggestions.
The respondent requested the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus against respondent Ken Hechler in his capacity as Secretary of State to compel him to implement
proposed amendments that were recommended by the State Election
Commission. These amendments would require 1) temporary election
workers be paid no more than five dollars per hour with a limit of
thirty-five dollars per day, 2) committees be limited to one temporary
worker per precinct on election day, and 3) committees be limited
to one worker per precinct on the days prior to the election. The
respondent denied that he had a duty to implement the proposed
amendments.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that there was not a clear
legal duty on the part of the Secretary of State to promulgate regulations that were proposed by the State Election Commission.
Noting that the Secretary of State is vested with broad authority
after consultation with the election commission to promulgate rules
and regulations in order to carry out the policies of the Legislature,
the court held that there was no clear duty for the Secretary of State
to be required to promulgate the rules recommended by the State
Election Commission. The requested writ was denied.
Gregory Vincent Smith
XV.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

State Ex Rel. Walton v. Casey, 370 S.E.2d 141 (W. Va. 1988).
No statute enacted by the Legislature may embrace more than
one object, and the object of the statute must be expressed in the
title.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/11
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The Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered an order to compel the executive director of the West Virginia Board of Medicine
to issue a permanent medical license to Enrique C. Mata, M.D.,
pursuant to West Virginia Code chapter 30, article 14, section 8A
(1987). In response, the Board petitioned the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition contending that the legislative act that contained the cited Code provision was defectively
titled and, thus, in violation of article 6, section 30 of the West
Virginia Constitution.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals agreed and awarded
the writ. The court held that the clear objective of article 6, section
30 (which reads in part "no act hereafter passed, shall embrace more
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title") is to
protect against enactment of laws where objects are placed into the
bills that are not stated in its title. The court held that the constitutional requirements of one object and subject in the title were
designed to give notice of the contents of an act and to prevent any
surreptitious insertion in the body of an act. The court further held
that the test is whether the title imparts enough information to one
interested in the subject to cause him to read the act.
Gregory Vincent Smith
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